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In the case at hand, the majority said, in any event, the
1920 Ruling 2 did not cover benefits paid to non-members.
The 1957 Ruling8 which expressly includes strike benefits
paid to non-members as taxable income was not considered,
presumably, since it was promulgated after the case arose.
Whether much weight can be given to the re-enactment
argument of the District Court is questionable. It would
seem that before one could say with certainty that Congress
has adopted an interpretative rule by the Treasury as evi-
dence of its view by repeated re-enactment of the statute,
it must be found Congress was aware of the ruling. Too
often this re-enactment argument appears to be a "tool
of the trade" used by the courts to get a desired result.
However the District Court seemed to have made a valid
point when it recognized that a ruling concerning the tax-
ability of strike benefits certainly had a widespread effect,
and therefore Congress could be presumed to have been
aware of it.
Furthermore, the other reasons for calling these strike
benefits income are more than sufficient. The Union seems
to have received consideration for making the payments.
From the standpoint of public policy, treating these benefits
as gifts rather than taxable income would tend to encourage
strikes. Since union dues are deductible to the union mem-
ber,34 it would seem that strike benefits should be taxable.
Such arguments in favor of treating the strike benefits as
income would appear to be more accurate and desirable,
both technically and policy-wise.
LYNN F. MEYms
Incumbrances On Devised Land
The Doctrine Of Exoneration
Tobiason v. Machen'
In 1953 Oliver F. Machen executed his last will and
testament. After making a general direction for the pay-
ment of all his debts, he devised all his "right, title, and
O1Supra, n. 29.
'2O.D. 552, Cum. Bull. No. 2, 73 (1920).
Rev. Ruling 57-1, 1957-1 Cum. Bull. 15.
O.D. 450, 1920-1 Cum. Bull. 105.
1 217 Md. 207, 142 A. 2d 145 (1958).
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interest.. ." in specified realty to Helen Tobiason and the
entire residuum to his mother, Mary V. Machen. At the
time the will was executed, the testator owned the specific-
ally devised property in fee simple, unincumbered, but
subsequently he placed a mortgage thereon, which re-
mained with an unpaid balance until his death in 1957. The
only other property owned by Machen at the time of his
death was a leasehold interest in one or more lots, also in-
cumbered by a mortgage.
The devisee contended that under the doctrine of exon-
eration the mortgage on her property should be paid out
of the residue of the estate, but the lower court held that
the testator's intention was to charge the property devised
with the payment of the unpaid balance of the mortgage,
and that such mortgage was not payable out of the personal
estate. The Court of Appeals, in reversing, held that as
between a specific devisee of incumbered real estate and a
residuary legatee, the devisee was to receive the property
exonerated from the burden of the mortgage, unless the
testator by express provision or by reasonable implication
has shown a contrary intention.
The doctrine of exoneration is a common law rule which
operates to discharge an incumbrance upon property pass-
ing to an heir,2 legatee,3 or devisee,4 usually at the expense
of the personal estate of the decedent. Although the rule
has generally been applied in relieving realty from the
burden of a mortgage,5 it has also operated to discharge it.
from annuities placed thereon by the testator,6 from yen-
2 Howell v. Price, 1 P. Wins. 291 (1715) ; Newhouse v. Smith, 2 Sm. & G.
344, 65 Eng. Rep. 429 (1854). See also discussion of exoneration in Chase v.
Lockerman, 11 Gill & J. 185 (Md. 1840).
8 Lange v. Lange, 127 N.J. Eq. 315, 12 A. 2d 840 (1940) ; Bothamley v.
Sherson, L.R. 20 Eq. 304 (1872) ; 'Knight v. Davis, 3 My. & K. 358, 40 Eng.
Rep. 136 (1833) ; Lightfoot v. Lightfoot's Ex'r., 27 Ala. 351 (1855).
'Harris v. Dodge, 72 Md. 186, 19 A. 597 (1890) ; Stieff v. Millikin, 162
Md. 245, 159 A. 599 (1932) ; Tobiason v. Machen, 217 Md. 207, 142 A. 2d
145 (1958) ; 'Gibson v. McCormick, 10 'Gill & J. 65, 108 (Md. 1838) -
however, here the land was not exonerated of a mortgage because the per-
sonalty was insufficient to cover the debts of the testator; Goodfellow v.
Newton, 320 Mass. 405, 69 N.E. 2d 569, 168 A.L.R. 698 (1946), involving a dis-
charge of a mortgage from both specific and residuary devises; Equitable
Trust Co. v. Shaw, 22 Del. Ch. 47, 194 A. 24 (1937), Involving a residuary
devise.
5 The doctrine applies to all incumbrances in the nature of liens. It is
generally applied In freeing the realty or a chattel of the burden of a
mortgage. Stieff v. Millikin, ibid.; Tobiason v. Machen, ibid.; Owen v. Lee,
185 Va. 160, 37 S.E. 2d 848 (1946) ; Equitable Trust Co. v. Shaw, ibid.;
Goodfellow v. Newton, ibid.; Note, Exoneration of Specific Property from
Incumbrances Existing at the Death of the Testator or Ancestor, 40 Harv.
L. Rev. 630 (1927).
Mitchell v. Mitchell, 21 Md. 244 (1864). The case specifically provided
that where the annuity was charged to the testator's entire realty which
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dor's liens,7 and from materialmen's liens and other similar
incumbrances8 In addition the doctrine has been used to
justify the exoneration of specifically devised property
where the testator had quitclaimed the property to the
devisee subsequent to the making of his will,9 and where
the property was held by entireties and the mortgage debt
was that of the husband alone.10 However, the rule is gen-
erally limited to debts which are the personal obligations
of the testator," and does not extend to incumbrances exist-
ing at the time he purchased or acquired the property, un-
less he subsequently made such debts his own.'2
In applying the doctrine the courts have followed no
single rule. In most instances it has been applied in favor
of specific devises," but has also been used for the benefit
of residuary devisees,'4 heirs,15 and specific legatees." As
the antithesis of the above, the courts have used the doc-
trine to the detriment of residuary legatees 7 or next of
kin,'8 but in absence of unusual circumstances not against
specific devisees."1 Furthermore, it has been stated that the
consisted of two tracts of equal value, one of which descended and the
other of which was specifically devised, the annuity was to be charged to
the land which descended, in exoneration of ,that specifically devised.
7 In re Riegelman's Estate, 174 Pa. St. 476, 34 A. 120 (1896).
840 Harv. L. Rev. 6.30.
Jacobs v Button, 79 Conn. 360, 65 A. 150 (1906).
10 Stieff v. Millikin, 162 Md. 245, 159 A. 599 (1932). Here, the will though
ineffective to pass title, was used by the court as evidence of intent.
I Stteff v. Millikin, ibid.; In re Taylor's Estate, 30 N.J. Super. 65, 103 A.
2d 268 (1954) ; Campbell v. Campbell, 140 N.J. Eq. 144, 53 A. 2d 630 (1947).
Stieff v. Millikin, supra n. 10; Equitable Trust Co. v. Shaw, 22 Del. Ch.
47, 194 A. 24 (1937); Owen v. Lee, 185 Va. 160, 37 S.E. 2d 848 (1946);
Steiglitz v. Migatz, 182 Ind. 549, 105 N.E. 465 (1914) ; Higinbotham v. Man-
chester, 113 Conn. 62, 154 A. 242, 79 A.L.R. 85 (1931); 4 PAoE, WILLs
(Lifetime ed. 1941).
mChase v. Lockerman, 11 Gill & J. 185 (Md. 1840); Stieff v. Millikin,
supra n. 10; Tobiason v. Machen, 217 Md. 207, 142 A. 2d 145 (1958);
French v. Vradenburg, 105 Va. 16, 52 S.E. 695 (1906) ; Morris v. Higbie,
53 N.J. Eq. 173, 32 A. 372 (1895) ; Todd v. McFall, 96 Va. 754, 32 S.E. 472
(1899).
1 Equitable Trust Co. v. Shaw, 22 Del. Ch. 47, 194 A. 24 (1937) ; Good-
fellow v. Newton, 322 Mass. 405, 69 N.E. 2d 569, 168 A.L.R. 698 (1946).
Howell v. Price, 1 P. Wms. 291 (1715) ; Newhouse v. Smith, 2 Sm. & G.
344, 65 Eng. Rep. 429 (1854) ; Chase v. Lockerman, 11 Gill & J. 185 (Md.
1840).
" Lange v. Lange, 127 N.J. Eq. 315, 12 A. 2d 840 (1940) ; Bothamley v.
Sherson, L.R. 20 Eq. 304 (1872) ; Knight v. Davis, 3 My. & K. 358, 40 Eng.
Rep. 136 (1833).
" Ruston v. Ruston, 2 Dallas 243 (U.S. 1796) ; Stieff v. Millikin, 162 Md.
245, 159 A. 599 (1932).
Pockley v. Pockley, 2 Vern. 36, 23 Eng. Rep. 290 (1869).
"In re Porter, 138 Cal. 618, 72 P. 173 (1903) ; In re Hodgkin's Estate, 110
Or. 381, 221 P. 169 (1923), reheard on another point 223 P. 738 (1924);
Raines v. Shipley, 197 Ga. 448, 29 S.E. 2d 588 (1944) ; Scott v. Currie, 144
Tex. 1, 187 S.W. 2d 551 (1945). It is noted that specific devises and specific
legacies have been abated to exonerate a general legacy to a widow, Addison,
Adm'r. v. Addison, 44 Md. 182 (1876).
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rule also will not apply against residuary devisees, 0 or
specific legatees.2'
The doctrine of exoneration has generally been justified
on two theories. First, that the personal estate has benefited
as a result of the incumbrance, and should, therefore, bear
the burden of removing it. 2  While valid in some cases,
this is hardly applicable to purchase money mortgages, or
improvement loans. The second theory is one of construc-
tion of the will, working on the premise that the testator
by making a specific legacy or devise intended that the
property should pass free of all incumbrances, and that
such incumbrances, as may exist, were intended to be paid
out of the personalty in the estate.23 Thus, the issue boils
down to one of the intent of the testator, and the doctrine
is offered as a means of satisfying that intent.
In addition to the above theories courts have cited the
common law rule which presumes that the personalty in
the testator's estate is the primary source from which his
debts are to be paid, rather than the property upon which
the incumbrance may constitute a lien. This priority re-
mains the accepted rule in Maryland, 24 as stated in the in-
stant case:
"It is now well-established law in Maryland that the
personal estate of a testator is the natural and primary
fund for the payment of debts; and, even when the real
estate is expressly charged with their payment, no re-
sort can be made to it, until the personalty is exhausted,
unless it has been exonerated by the terms of the
will. ' '25
Morris v. Higbie, 53 N.J. Eq. 173, 32 A. 372 (1895) ; Note, 40 Harv. L.
Rev. 630, 632, op. cit. supra, n. 5
21 Ruston v. Ruston, 2 Dallas 243 (U.S. 1796) ; O'Neal v. Mead, 1 P. Wms.
693, 24 Eng. Rep. 574 (1720). Nonetheless there can be found cases in which
a specific or residuary devise has been exonerated at the expense of resi-
duary devisees or specific legatees. See: Towle v. Swasey, 160 Mass. 100
(1870) ; Morgan v. Walkins, 214 Ala. 671, 108 So. 561 (1926) ; Lightfoot v.
Lightfoot's Ex'r., 27 Ala. 351 (1855). However, in each of these cases the
testator designated In his will that, if it should be necessary for the settle-
ment of his debts, certain residuary realty or specific legacies should be
abated for that purpose.
2 Keene v. Munn, 16 N.J. Eq. 398 (1863) ; Appeal of Beard, 78 Conn. 481,
62 A. 704 (1906) ; PAGE, OP. cit. supra, n. 12, 631.
0 Note, 40 Harv. L. Rev. 630.
m Chase v. Lockerman, 11 Gill & J. 185 (Md. 1840) ; Van Bibber v. Reese,
71 Md. 608, 18 A. 892 (1889) ; Harris v. Dodge, 72 Md. 186, 191, 19 A. 597
(1890) ; Tobiason v. Machen, 217 Md. 207, 142 A. 2d 145 (1958) ; Reno, The
Maryland Order of Abatement of Legacies and Devises, 17 Md. L. Rev. 285
(1957).
21 Tobiason v. Machen, ibid., 211.
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Most of the courts have treated exoneration as a rule
of construction, using the above rule of priority to raise a
presumption that the testator intended to have the debt
paid by his personal estate unless a contrary intention
appears in the will. This has resulted in a multitude of
decisions based, in some cases, upon purely arbitrary stand-
ards and often conflicting in their application. For example,
a general direction to pay debts has been held to indicate
an intention to pay a mortgage out of the general estate;26
however, other cases have held that such a direction does
not show an intention to exonerate the realty, or that
the words were merely form and do not indicate any specific
intention." The Maryland Court in the subject case, placed
emphasis upon the fact that the testator incumbered the
property subsequent to the execution of his will,2" but other
courts have treated this as irrelevant. 9 A devise "subject
to incumbrances" has been exonerated,30 but a devise out-
right or absolutely was held not to show any intention on
the part of the testator to exonerate it." This principle of
construction has evolved in Maryland more from dicta than
decisions. In Harris v. Dodge,82 although the doctrine itself
was not applied, the Court said:
"... it is a well established general rule, that where
a debtor has a portion of his real estate under mort-
gage ... , and he makes his will devising the mort-
gaged estate, (and there be no intention to the con-
trary either express or implied), in such case, as be-
tween the devisee and the residuary legatee, though
not to disappoint either general or specific legatees, the
personal assets are the primary fund to be applied for
the payment of the mortgage debt, in exoneration of
the land.' '83
When applied in cases of intestacy, the use of the doc-
trine as a rule of construction breaks down completely.
1O'Meara v. Shreve, 26 F. 2d 998 (D.C. App. 1928); In re Metcalfe's
Estate, 199 Cal. 716, 251 P. 202, 204 (1926) (dictum).
27 Kella. 's Ex'rs. v. Jacob, 152 Va. 725, 148 S.E. 835 (1929) ; In re Keil's
Estate, ... el ... , 140 A. 2d 139 (1958) ; PAGs, op. cit. 8upra, n. 12, 306.
Tobiaso . Machen, supra, n. 24.
In re Kel Estate, supra, n. 27.
10 Serle v. St. Eloy, 2 P. Wms. 386, 22 Eng. Rep. 319, 436 (1726), where the
testator had charged certain lands with the payment of debts and general
legacies. For cases contra, see: Jackson v. Bevins, 74 Conn. 96, 49 A. 899
(1901) ; Guthrie v. Guthrie, 130 Kan. 433, 286 P. 195 (1930).
1 Creesy v. Willis, 159 Mass. 249, 34 N.E. 265 (1893) ; In re Reynold's
Estate, 94 Vt. 149, 109 A. 60, 63 (1920) ; PAGE, 0P. Cit. supra, n. 12, § 1490.




Obviously, if the decedent left no will there is nothing to
which this construction can be applied, unless the court is
merely speculating upon testamentary intent from the non-
testamentary acts of the decedent during his lifetime. This
is not to imply, however, that such intent cannot be con-
strued from partial intestacy.
In Cunningham v. Cunningham4 the Court held that
the principle was not applicable where the burdened prop-
erty passed to a surviving tenant by the entirety and not
by devise, and that the personal estate was liable only for
proportionate constribution as a co-principal. However, the
Court in Stieff v. Millikin,5 cited the Cunningham case but,
in effect, rejected its decision and held that the property,
which passed to a surviving tenant by the entirety, was
exonerated from the entire burden of the mortgage. There
is a clear distinction between these two cases, since in the
Stieff case the mortgage was executed to secure a pre-
existing debt of the testator, and therefore, it was held to
be his personal debt and not that of his wife while in the
Cunningham case it was a joint debt. Furthermore, in the
Stieff case the Court found in the testator's will, which was
ineffective to pass title to the property in question, that it
was his intention that the property should pass to his sur-
viving spouse free of all incumbrances.
In applying the doctrine of exoneration in the instant
case, the Court, relying heavily upon the principle that the
personalty of the testator is the natural and primary fund
for the payment of his debts, rejected the appellee's con-
tention that the use of the words "all my right, title and
interest" indicated an intent on the part of the testator for
the devisee to take the property cum onere.3 6 To support its
position the Court cited Miller as follows:
" 'Very clear expressions are required in order to
fasten the incumbrance on the property. Thus a devise
of land "subject to a mortgage", or any other incum-
brance, does not per se exonerate the personal property,
for these terms are merely a description of the real
property devised * * V' -37
On the other hand, a further examination of Miller indi-
cates that this is a "construction which 'it is probable gen-
158 Md. 372, 148 A. 444 (1930).
162 Md. 245, 159 A. 599 (1932).
Subject to an incumbrance or charge. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (4th
Ed. 1951) 455.
17Tobiason v. Machen, 217 Md. 207, 211, 142 A. 2d 145 (1958), citing
MILLA, CONSTRUCTION OF WILS (1927) § 387.
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erally defeats the intention'."3 The Court did have some
additional authority for finding as it did. In Equitable Trust
Co. v. Shaw," the Delaware Court found that of necessity
the testator by devising "all my interest in real estate what-
soever and wherever situate" intended that the devisee take
free from all mortgages on such property. However, the
Court might have referred to two contrary cases which
dealt with this problem of intent being expressed in the
words "right, title and interest". In Howell v. Ott,40 the
Mississippi Court said:
"The testator [sic] having used these words, [all
my right, title and interest], it is manifest that she in-
tended the devise.., to be of such estate as she had in
the lands at her death, and it was her intention, we
think, that the devisee should take the same cum
onere."
41
The same view was taken by the Court of Appeals of Ken-
tucky in Taylor's Ex'r. v. Broadway Methodist Church.42
By analogy to the construction placed on deeds which con-
vey the grantor's "right, title, and interest" (generally
being only a quitclaim deed), the view taken by the Missis-
sippi and Kentucky Courts seems to be the most logical.
In modern times, the influence of the doctrine of exoner-
ation has been waning. It is unpopular among the text
writers43 on the ground that it does not properly execute
the true intention of most testators. Furthermore, in some
jurisdictions it has been narrowed by statute and judicial
decision or abolished altogether.44 In light of these develop-
ments, it might have been preferable for the Court to have
restricted the application of the doctrine rather than to
have extended it beyond the existing case law in Maryland.
8MrLtuR, ibid., 1065. Italics added.
122 Del. Ch. 47, 194 A. 24 (1937).
40182 Miss. 252, 180 So. 52 (1938), suggestion of error overruled, 181
So. 740 (1938).
1 Ibid., 63.
269 Ky. 108, 106 S.W. 2d 69 (1937). It should be noted, however, that
neither this nor the Howell case, supra, n. 40, was conclusive upon the ques-
tion of "right, title, and interest". The Howell decision was also based
upon a failure to probate the debt strictly in accordance with the terms of
the will, and the Taylor case held that the testatrix was only secondarily
liable and therefore, the debt was not her personal obligation during her
lifetime.
"PAGE, op. cit. supra, n. 12, § 1490; ATKINSON, WULS (2nd ed. 1953) 766;
3 AMEIOAN LAW OF PROPERTY (1952), § 14.25.
" Statutes such as those of Massachusetts and New York abolish the doc-
trine as a rule of construction without eliminating the possibility of exonera-
tion. The effect is a reversal of the common law rule, e.g., the devisee
takes the property cum onere unless a contrary intent appears in the will.
19591
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This could have been done by refusing exoneration on the
grounds that the testator by devising "all [his] right, title,
and interest" in the property did not intend that it was to
pass free of incumbrances, and by distinguishing Stieff v.
Millikin45 altogether or overruling it on this point. As a
result of this decision, however, curtailment or abolition of
this archaic and often inequitable doctrine rests squarely
with the Maryland Legislature.
EUGENE H. ScHEmFR
Impossibility Of Performance Amounting To A
Total Failure Of Consideration Due To
Governmental Action
Montauk Corporation v. Seeds'
Defendant Montauk Corporation, a housing developer,
constructed a sewage pumping station as a part of its hous-
ing project. Defendant accepted plaintiff's offer to service
the station upon its completion for a period of five years.
Under a local statute, in existence at the time the con-
tract was made, the construction and operation of sewage
pumping stations were subject to the supervision and gen-
eral control of the local Sanitary Commission, the Com-
mission being further empowered to take over such pri-
vately owned facilities by purchase or condemnation.2
There was no condemnation, but, presumably acting under
its statutory power, the Sanitary Commission did decide
in this instance to operate the facility itself. The Com-
mission entered into a contract with defendant to operate
the station permanently for the same amount of money de-
fendant had promised plaintiff for only five years of service.
Plaintiff successfully sued for damages arising from defen-
dant's breach of the executory contract and defendant
appealed.3
Defendant-appellant unsuccessfully contended that its
breach of contract was the result of governmental action
and so was excused by the "frustration" doctrine, without
-162 Md. 245, 159 A. 599 (1932).
1215 Md. 491, 138 A. 2d 907 (1958).
2 MONTGOMrRY COUNTY CODr (1955), §74-55.
8 The Sanitary Commission, joined as a third-party defendant, received
a jury verdict in its favor. Since no judgment was entered on this ver-
dict, only the relative rights of plaintiff and Montauk Corporation were
before the Court on appeal.
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